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This paper builds on Prayag and van Rensburg’s (2006) study that recognised the returns that can 
be generated by acting on changes in consensus recommendations on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE). It identifies factors that influence analysts to revise their recommendations based 
on style anomalies, momentum strategies, and market sentiment. Findings indicate that analysts’ 
recommendations on the JSE are driven by similar factors to those in other major markets with a 
propensity for favouring high-growth stocks with low value multiples. The results for tests in 
which variables are lagged for longer periods suggest that historical price changes have a more 
significant impact on analyst revisions than recent changes. 
 





he question of whether the stock recommendations generated by financial analysts add value is 
complicated by the optimism bias, conflict of interest (Michaely & Womack, 2005) and herding 
(Conrad, Cornell, Landsman, & Rountree, 2006) reflected in recommendations. 
 
Internationally, Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Truman (2001) found evidence to show that following 
analysts’ recommendations could yield returns in excess of the market, but that the required rebalancing costs 
eroded these returns. Green (2006) highlighted that economic profits could be realized conditional on the timely 
reaction to recommendations, while Womack (1996) found that acting on changes in recommendation instead of the 
level alone could earn greater returns. 
 
In the South African market, Hall and Millard (2002) found that acting on the level of recommendation 
yielded returns at least as good as the market and could limit losses, but it was van Rensburg and Prayag (2006) who 
recognized the significant-risk adjusted returns that could be yielded by acting on changes in analyst consensus 
recommendations and in particular the value of downgrades. 
 
While research into factors that drive analyst recommendations is sparse, Michaely and Womack (2005) 
highlighted the large capitalization and glamour stock bias of stocks followed by analysts. Loh and Stulz (2009) 
identified characteristics of firms whose changes in recommendations prove more influential (including those with 
fewer prior earnings forecasts) and Womack (1996) suggested that changes in analyst recommendations are likely 
price-driven based on their timing relative to earnings announcements. 
 
A similar analysis has yet to be conducted on the South African market and this study aims to remedy this 
by identifying the factors that influence the change in analyst consensus recommendations. It considers factors that 
have demonstrated a capacity to explain the variation in stock returns in the past and will therefore include style 
anomalies recognized in the South African market, including price-to-earnings, dividend-yield, cash flow-to-price 
(van Rensburg & Robertson, 2003), market-to-book value (Auret & Sinclaire, 2006), dividend and earnings growth 
T 
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(Kruger & Toerien, 2014), and momentum (Fraser & Page, 2000). Additional consideration will be made of other 
factors recognized internationally including sales-to-price (Barbee, Mukherji, & Raines, 1996) and sentiment 
(Kaplanski & Levy, 2010). 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 highlights prior research concerning the 
value of analyst recommendations and factors that are likely to influence analysts based on their empirical ability to 
explain the variation in stock returns. Section 3 outlines the data used and methodology while Section 4 describes 
the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. PRIOR RESEARCH 
 
The finding that only 12% of all changes in recommendations in a sample of US analysts occurred within 
one day of earnings announcements (Womack, 1996), indicated that revisions are not necessarily made based on 
sudden factor changes or broadcasts, but are rather based on an accumulation of factors. It is also possible that 
changes in recommendations are driven by factors other than fundamentals such as the macroeconomic 
environment, relevant industry, or the stock price itself. 
 
Factors that drive stock returns are likely to drive analyst recommendations in general and should therefore 
be correlated with factors that have historically demonstrated the ability to explain variation in stock returns. Within 
the South African Market, van Rensburg and Robertson (2003) identified relevant style characteristics by assessing 
24 attributes of stocks pertaining to value, future earnings growth and rationality and neglect. They concluded that 
price-to-net asset value, dividend-yield, price-to-earnings, size, and cash flow-to-price were all significant as 
univariate predictors of price and the combination of size and price-to-earnings as a multifactor model was optimal 
in explaining the cross-section of stock returns. 
 
Auret and Sinclaire (2006) suggested book-to-market as an additional style anomaly, finding that it has 
more explanatory power than size or price-to-earnings, but its high correlation with other explanatory variables 
means that van Rensburg and Roberton’s model (including size and price-to-earnings) still better describes the 
variation in returns. Kruger and Toerien (2014) subsequently found that 12-month earnings and dividend growth are 
significant univariate factors in explaining the returns of JSE-listed companies. 
 
Internationally, Barbee, Mukherji, and Raines (1996) assessed the significance of sales-to-price and debt-
to-equity ratios in explaining stock returns and found them to absorb the effect of both book-to-market and firm size. 
They highlighted Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan’s (1995) study, which previously indicated the inconsistency of book-
to-market in explaining the variation in returns, suggesting it is less significant than when presented originally by 
Fama and French (1992). The debt-to-equity ratio makes sense as a measure of risk (Bhandari, 1988) since 
increasing the debt-to-equity ratio would subsequently increase the risk to any common equity holder, but is 
considered to be captured by sales-to-price which appears to be the only measure with consistent explanatory power 
(Barbee, Mukherji, & Raines, 1996). 
 
Finally, Kaplanski and Levy (2010) identified the positive correlation between analyst recommendations 
and sentiment indices, which suggests that analysts (like unsophisticated investors) are affected by market 
sentiment. The result is most significant during periods of negative sentiment and more likely to occur when stock is 
considered difficult to evaluate. 
 
Interestingly, while one could reasonably expect that analyst recommendations should be driven by the 
same factors that drive return prediction cited above, numerous studies have ascertained that firms that analysts tend 
to make recommendations for have a large capitalization bias (appropriately reflecting the investment opportunity 
set), and tend to be growth stocks with glamour characteristics such as high positive price momentum, high volume, 
greater past sales growth, and higher expected long term earnings growth.
1
 This would suggest that the stocks 
analysts recommend demonstrate characteristics that run contrary to the predictive signals for stock returns typically 
highlighted in the literature (Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, & Lee, 2004). In addition Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok 
                                                          
1 See for example Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004) and Michaely and Womack (2005). 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2014 Volume 30, Number 3 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 961 The Clute Institute 
(1999) found that stocks with strong buy recommendations exhibit higher price momentum relative to stocks with 
strong sell recommendations. Loh and Stulz (2009) identified common characteristics of the firms whose changes in 
recommendations proved influential to investors. They identified these firms as smaller, with higher institutional 
ownership, lower total and idiosyncratic volatility, lower stock turnover, and lower number of prior earnings 
forecasts. 
 




Analyst consensus recommendations of 92 companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) for the 
period spanning January 2002 to December 2009 were obtained from I-Net Bridge. The recommendations were 
filtered to include only changes that lasted at least one month so that any change considered was more likely to 
reflect an adjustment in analysts’ perception of stock and exclude frequent changes of analysts whom are not 
influential but are reflected through aggregation of recommendations. 
 
The total number of changes in analyst consensus recommendations observed over the sample period 
amounted to 1,767. 590 (33.4%) of these changes in recommendation persisted for at least one month and, of those 
changes, 71 (12.1%) represent changes between sell and hold, while 519 (87.9%) reflect changes between buy and 
hold. The proportion of observations concerning the relevant changes reflect Michaely and Womack’s (2005) 
documented optimism bias of analyst recommendations as well as their reluctance to downgrade stock to sell. For 
purposes of this study we focus on the changes in recommendation suggested to hold the most information content – 
changes from hold to buy and hold to sell. 
 
Daily total returns data was obtained from Thomsons Datastream for each of the companies in question as 
was company-specific time series data pertaining to the factors to be tested: price-to-earnings, dividend yield, 
market-to-book value, gross profit margin, sales-to-price, cash flow-to-price, the change in 12-month earnings per 
share, the change in 12-month dividends per share, dividend payout ratio, return on equity, and return on assets. In 
addition, percentage changes in the historical levels of the Business Confidence Index (BCI), considered to reflect 
market sentiment, over the applicable period were obtained. 
 
Table 1: Factors to be Considered as Explanatory Variables in the Analysis 
A brief description of the proposed explanatory variables along with the relevant acronyms used throughout the analysis. 
Factors Description 
1. BCI Business Confidence Index – a measure of market sentiment 
2. THREEMOM Three-month momentum – performance of stock over the previous three months 
3. TWELVEMOM Twelve-month momentum – performance of stock over the previous twelve months 
4. RISK Risk of stock calculated based on the standard deviation of returns over the previous 12 months 
5. PE Price-to-earnings ratio 
6. DY Dividend yield 
7. MTBV Market-to-book value 
8. GPMARGIN Gross profit margin 
9. SALESP Sales-to-Price 
10. CFTP Cash flow-to-price 
11. TWELVEEARNG The 12-month growth in DPS 
12. TWELVEDIVG The 12-month growth in EPS 
13. PAYOUT The dividend pay-out ratio of the firm 
14. ROE The firm's return on equity ratio 
15. ROA The firm’s return on assets ratio 
 
Four separate databases were generated to reflect different lags on the company-specific factors (with 
respect to the change in recommendation) and the form of factor considered. For the first database, changes in 
recommendations were associated with company-specific factors that were lagged by one month. In the second 
database, company-specific factors were lagged by six months. While the lag of one month reflects common 
practice in analysis of style attributes to ensure that information may be considered sufficiently disseminated 
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amongst analysts, the lag of six months allows for the consideration that changes in recommendations are not 
influenced by recent company-specific factors but by either historical factors or recent changes in analyst’s 
recommendations (particularly leader analysts). This is in response to a study by Conrad et al. (2006) suggesting that 
analysts delay changing their recommendation on stock (especially downgrading) until the change is corroborated 
by a change in price and that recommendations demonstrate herding. 
 
In the third database, company-specific factors were specified as relative measures based on the 
improvement (or decline) of the factor since the last change in recommendation. Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) found 
that earnings forecasting could be improved by the use of financial signals based on changes in fundamental 
variables in relation to one another and therefore analysis of the improvement (or decline) in company-specific 
factors is relevant. The fourth database was also based on relative measures but lagged by six months. 
 
Finally, all databases considered both the entire observation period (2002-2009) as well as a subset (2002-
2007) considered to be a more stable market environment due to its exclusion of the recent financial crisis. The 
importance of evaluating company-specific financial indicators within their respective macroeconomic 
environments were highlighted by Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) and stressed by Kruger and Toerien (2014) in the 
context of style anomalies. 
 
3.2 Regression Analysis 
 
Regression analysis was performed to identify which factors (if any) could explain a change in consensus 
recommendation. The dependent variable is a binary response variable (zi) for which logistic regression modelling is 
appropriate and was modelled based on upgrades from hold to buy relative to downgrades from hold to sell. 
 
Logistic regression and the use of a binomial link function (discussed below) required that observations 
reflecting similar characteristics with respect to the proposed explanatory variables, be grouped. Where the 
improvement (or decline) of factors was considered, observations were grouped to reflect a decline of more than 5%, 
a change within a band of 5%, and an improvement greater than 5%. In this way, groups that differed with respect to 
the combination of factor levels they characterized (from here on referred to as categorical groups) were established 
and observations were sorted accordingly. 
 
Each change in recommendation can be described as a binary response variable such that: 
 
zi = 1 if stock upgraded with probability p 
 = 0 if stock downgraded with probability (1-p) 
 





   
 
   
 
  (1) 
 
and Y, the number of observed upgrades within each categorical group (representing n observations), has a binomial 
distribution. 
 
          (2) 
 
The dependent variable, assumed to have a binomial distribution, is therefore appropriately modelled 
through a generalized linear regression. P, continuous on the range [0; 1], is transformed to reflect the potential 
range of the linear combination of explanatory variables on the interval (-∞; ∞) through the use the logistic link 
function (considered the most appropriate link for binary responses). Parameters are estimated using the method of 
maximum likelihood (since the error term is not normally distributed as it is associated with the distribution of the 
dependent variable) and factors are considered significant based on a level of 5%. 
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The logistic regression equation is specified as: 
 
    
   
     
                       
   
    
                     (3) 
 
Where     is the estimated probability of an upgrade in stock associated with categorical group i,    represents the 
sensitivity to factor j such that for a one unit increase in factor j the odds of an upgrade improve by     and     is the 
factor value of explanatory variable k for categorical group i. 
 
Explanatory variables included the BCI and company-specific factors defined by appropriate intervals over 
their range of values. Such intervals were coded to reflect ranking and enabled these factors to be recognized as 
continuous variables in the analysis, while at the same time limiting the number of possible values for each factor to 
ensure a sufficient sample size for each categorical group. 
 
The regression method used accounts for missing values by excluding them from the analysis. Therefore, 
the datasets used for each univariate model differed in size and bivariate models could not be compared to their 
respective nested models through commonplace F-tests. The comparison of models that are based on different 
datasets is possible through the use of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), which favours the smallest residual 
variance and penalizes the addition of further explanatory variables: 
 
AIC = 2k – 2ln(L) (4) 
 
where k indicates the number of parameters in the statistical model, n reflects the number of observations the 
analysis is based on and L indicates the maximized value of the likelihood function for the estimated model. 
 
Forward selection methods were used to identify the optimal model for changes from hold to buy relative to 
hold to sell over the periods considered. This process involves starting with simple univariate models, identifying 
the best one and adding additional explanatory variables on the basis that they improve the model according to 
specified criterion. The AIC criterion was used to establish model ranking. 
 
The linear components of the models identified were then checked by plotting residuals versus fitted values 




4.1 Univariate Logistic Regressions 
 
Logistic regression of binary responses is limited to the analysis of mutually exclusive events such as a 
change in recommendation that cannot be both an upgrade and a downgrade. Therefore the interpretation of the 
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Table 2: Results for the Logistic Regressions for Changes in Recommendations from Hold to Buy Relative to Hold to Sell 
against Factors Lagged by One Month 
Logistic regression analysis is conducted for company-specific factors lagged by one month with respect to the change in 
recommendation considered. The regressions aim to determine those factors which increase the odds of an upgrade from hold 
to buy relative to a downgrade from hold to sell. Results which are significant at the 5% level are indicated by *, at the 1% 
level by **, and at the 0.1% level by ***. 
Company-Specific Factors Lagged By 1 Month 
 2002-2007 2002-2009 
 Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
BCI -0,310 0,463 -0,350 0,357 
THREEMOM 0,275 0,379 0,120 0,626 
TWELVEMOM 0,820 0,019* 0,297 0,283 
RISK 0,427 0,579 -0,221 0,649 
DY -1,278 0,000*** -1,012 0,000*** 
GPMARGIN -0,143 0,782 -0,101 0,810 
MTBV 1,568 0,005** 1,121 0,016* 
SALESP -0,201 0,463 -0,132 0,606 
PE 0,900 0,039* 0,792 0,037* 
CFTP -0,238 0,468 -0,067 0,813 
TWELVEEARNG 1.250 0.00097*** 1.099 0.00151** 
TWELVEDIVG 0.607 0.263 0.551 0.240 
PAYOUT -0.417 0.162 -0.128 0.640 
ROE 1.412 0.00118** 0.859 0.02138* 
ROA 1.160 0.0177* 0.873 0.0338* 
Notes: Results which are significant at the 5% level are indicated by *, at the 1% level by **, and at the 0.1% level by ***. 
 
Factors identified as significant for upgrades from hold to buy relative to hold to sell were twelve-month 
momentum, dividend yield, market-to-book value, price-to-earnings, growth in 12-month earnings, return on equity, 
and return on assets and were all (barring twelve-month momentum) consistent over both sample periods 
considered. While each of these factors (apart from return on equity and return on assets) has been identified in the 
South African market as a style anomaly, analysis of the parameter estimates for price-to-earnings and market-to-
book value suggest that higher multiples influence stock upgrades while estimates for dividend yield indicate that 
lower multiples influence stock upgrades. This contradicts the literature surrounding these respective style 
anomalies, which suggests buying undervalued firms based on their low price-to-earnings and market-to-book value 
ratios and high dividend yield ratios. In addition, twelve-month momentum has historically suggested mean-
reversion and has therefore been negatively correlated with returns, contrary to the positive relationship identified 
here. These results, as well as the presence of the 12-month earnings growth factor, agree with findings for the US 




A further consideration is the lag assumed between an analyst changing their stock recommendations away 
from the existing consensus recommendation and the actual change in consensus recommendation. While Prayag 
and van Rensburg’s (2006) study of the period from 2000 to 2003 suggests that abnormal returns can be earned 
using strategies based on acting on changes in consensus recommendations, there is a possibility that some of the 
price move has already occurred by the time the consensus recommendation changes. We therefore repeat the 
analysis with the database in which the company-specific factors were lagged by six months in relation to the date 









                                                          
2 See Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004) and Michaely and Womack (2005). 
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Table 3: Results for the Logistic Regressions for Changes in Recommendations from Hold to Buy Relative to Hold to Sell 
against Factors Lagged by Six Months 
Logistic regression analysis is conducted for company-specific factors lagged by six months with respect to the change in 
recommendation considered. The regressions aim to determine those factors which increase the odds of an upgrade from hold 
to buy relative to a downgrade from hold to sell. Results which are significant at the 5% level are indicated by *, at the 1% 
level by **, and at the 0.1% level by ***. 
Company-Specific Factors Lagged By 6 Months 
  2002-2007 2002-2009 
  Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
THREEMOM 0,191 0,527 -0,120 0,654 
TWELVEMOM 1,195 0,001*** 0,614 0,020* 
RISK 0,257 0,692 0,329 0,559 
DY -1,906 0,000*** -1,467 0,000*** 
GPMARGIN -0,195 0,731 -0,193 0,666 
MTBV 1,942 0,001** 1,088 0,030* 
SALESP -0,330 0,241 -0,192 0,456 
PE 0,358 0,411 0,449 0,222 
CFTP -0,191 0,537 0,060 0,836 
TWELVEEARNG 1.408 0.000136*** 1.016 0.00120** 
TWELVEDIVG 1.680 0.988 1.822 0.078 
PAYOUT -0.431 0.146 -0.206 0.452 
ROE 0.519 0.173164 0.494 0.160 
ROA 1.088 0.0239* 0.799 0.0472* 
Notes: Results which are significant at the 5% level are indicated by *, at the 1% level by **, and at the 0.1% level by ***. 
 
Factors identified as significant for upgrades from hold to buy based on company-specific data lagged by 
six months were twelve-month momentum, dividend-yield, market-to-book value, 12-month earnings growth, and 
return on assets and all significant variables were consistent over both periods considered. The absolute parameter 
estimates of the price factors are consistently and considerably higher than those based on the factors lagged by one 
month suggesting that historical price moves are more influential in improving the odds of a change in consensus 
recommendation than more recent price moves. This may indicate that more experienced analysts with higher 
leader-follower ratios from larger brokers make recommendation changes away from consensus, which is reflected 
later in consensus recommendations due to either herding or other analysts reacting to the same information. 
Analysts with these characteristics have been previously identified as having more influential changes in 
recommendations (Loh & Stultz, 2009). 
 
Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) demonstrated the importance of using relative measures through their 
identification of financial indicators that improved earnings forecasts. These indicators were based on the 
improvement (or decline) of financial variables in relation to the improvement (or decline) of other financial 
variables. It is therefore relevant to consider factors’ improvement (or decline) since the last recommendation 
change. 
 
Company-specific factors for both changes considered (new change in recommendation and previous 
change in recommendation) were lagged by one month with respect to the change considered. The analysis was 
repeated based on these changes in company-specific factors being lagged by at least six months. This enabled 
analysis of changes in company-specific factors that leading analysts could possibly be responding to or factors that 
influence analysts decision to change recommendation that are only realized in conjunction with a price move. 
Based on the intervals on which improvements (or declines) were implemented, parameters estimates imply the 
exponential increase (or decrease) in odds of an upgrade (or upgrade from hold to buy) for the improvement of a 
factor by at least 5% (or a decline of a factor by at least 5%). Factors that already represent changes in one of the 
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Table 4: Results for the Logistic Regressions of Changes in Factors Relative to Changes in Recommendations from Hold 
to Buy Relative to Hold to Sell 
Logistic regression analysis is conducted for the percentage improvement (or decline) of company-specific factors lagged by at least 
one month or at least six months with respect to the change in recommendation considered. The regressions aim to determine those 
factors which increase the odds of an upgrade from hold to buy relative to a downgrade from hold to sell. Results which are 
significant at the 5% level are indicated by *, at the 1% level by **, and at the 0.1% level by ***. 
Change In Company-Specific Factors Lagged 1 Months 
  2002-2007 2002-2009 
Change In Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
DY 0,072 0,857 0,091 0,780 
GPMARGIN 2,021 0,042* 1,588 0,022* 
MTBV 0,721 0,055 0,427 0,166 
SALESP -0,447 0,296 0,109 0,746 
PE 0,116 0,767 -0,003 0,993 
CFTP 0,313 0,408 0,080 0,798 
PAYOUT -0.587 0.271 -0.057 0.903 
ROE 0.445 0.415 0.626 0.157 
ROA 1.208 0.010* 1.253 0.002** 
Change In Company-Specific Factors Lagged 6 Months 
  2002-2007 2002-2009 
Change In Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
DY 0.244 0.538 -0.074 0.824 
GPMARGIN 1.657 0.133 1.781 0.032* 
MTBV 0.332 0.380 0.283 0.377 
SALESP 0.030 0.944 0.184 0.595 
PE -0.553 0.157 -0.220 0.486 
CFTP -0,184 0,443 -0,112 0,566 
PAYOUT 0.188 0.746 0.304 0.577 
ROE 0.504 0.320 0.058 0.889 
ROA 0.4860 0.238 0.062 0.861 
Notes: Results which are significant at the 5% level are indicated by *, at the 1% level by **, and at the 0.1% level by ***. 
 
The only significant factors, based on their improvements since the last recommendation change, for 
upgrades from hold to buy lagged by one month were gross profit margin and return on assets, over both periods 
considered. It is intuitive to consider gross profit margin based on its improvement (or decline) and not its absolute 
figure since different industries exhibit different margin ranges. Similarly, ROA is a measure of efficiency and is 
best interpreted based on changes over time rather than point estimates in time. For company-specific factors lagged 
by six months, only gross profit margin was significant and only for the period which includes the crisis. 
 
4.2 Multivariate Logistic Regressions 
 
Lastly, we construct a multivariate logistic regression model that best explains changes in analyst 
recommendations from hold to buy relative to hold to sell over the stable period considered in the earlier analysis. 
The model identifies the individual company specific factor which yields the lowest AIC score. A stepwise process 
is then employed to identify the additional factors to be added at each step which further improve (lower) the model 
scores. The results are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Stepwise Models for Changes in Analyst Recommendations from Hold to Buy Relative to Hold to Sell 
Results of building a model, based on minimizing the AIC, for changes from hold to buy relative to hold to sell over the stable period 
for factors lagged by one and six months. The model employs a stepwise approach in identifying the best base variable and then 
adding additional variables that improve the AIC score into a multivariate model. 
Company-Specific Factors Lagged By 1 Month AIC 
 ~ GPMARGIN  90.354 
 ~ GPMARGIN + TWELVEEARNG  72.026 
 ~ GPMARGIN + TWELVEEARNG + MTBV  54.553 
 ~ GPMARGIN + TWELVEEARNG + MTBV + DY  45.826 
 ~ GPMARGIN + TWELVEEARNG + MTBV + DY + ROE  41.417 
 ~ GPMARGIN + TWELVEEARNG + MTBV + DY + ROE + TWELVEDIVG  37.148 
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Table 5 cont. 
Company-Specific Factors Lagged By 6 Months AIC 
 ~ GPMARGIN  75.129 
 ~ GPMARGIN + TWELVEEARNG  57.116 
 ~ GPMARGIN + TWELVEEARNG + DY  47.094 
 ~ GPMARGIN + TWELVEEARNG + DY + TWELVEDIVG  36.803 
 ~ GPMARGIN + TWELVEEARNG + DY + TWELVEDIVG + MTBV  29.254 
 ~ GPMARGIN + TWELVEEARNG + DY + TWELVEDIVG + MTBV + ROA  25.093 
Note: The models employ a stepwise approach in identifying the best base variable and then adding additional variables that improve the AIC 
score into a multivariate model. 
 
The optimal model based on company-specific factors lagged by one month includes gross profit margin, 
dividend yield, market-to-book value, return on equity and twelve-month earnings and dividend growth while the 
optimal model based on company specific data lagged by six months includes the same factors except for return on 
assets replacing return on equity. The factors for both models are consistent with the univariate factors identified in 
the earlier analysis apart from the inclusion of gross profit margin and growth in twelve month dividends. 
 
While these models are optimal given the pool of explanatory variables considered, a plot of residuals 
versus fitted values suggests that trend in error persists in both cases and therefore the linear component is 
inadequate to fully describe variation. This suggests an opportunity for analysis of further factors that may be 




This study seeks to identify factors that influence analysts to change their recommendation on stock based 
on logistic regression analysis of consensus recommendations over the period of 2002 to 2009. It is the first such 
study for the JSE and builds on research by van Rensburg and Prayag’s (2009) who identified the value of 
investment strategies based on the use of changes in consensus. 
 
Findings are interpreted as factors that increase the probability of an upgrade or change in consensus 
recommendation from hold to buy, relative to a downgrade or change in consensus recommendation from hold to 
sell. The factors considered most significant were twelve-month momentum, dividend yield and market-to-book 
value, price-earnings ratio, 12-month earnings growth, return on equity, and return on assets. The same factors were 
significant when lagged by six months, apart from price-earnings ratio and return on equity. The parameter estimates 
of the price factors were considerably higher when based on the six-month lag, suggesting that historical price 
changes are more influential than recent changes in influencing recommendation revisions. 
 
An analysis of the impact of improvements or declines in factors on recommendation revisions found that 
the percentage improvement (or decline) in gross profit margin and return on assets since the last change in 
recommendation was significant based on a one-month lag. Gross profit margin remained significant when 
considering changes lagged by six months. 
 
Interpretation of the results suggests that analyst recommendations are most likely price-driven, a notion 
suggested by Womack (1996), and that there could be a potential lag in the change in consensus recommendation in 
relation to the price movement. 
 
Model development, based on the stable period, recognized a model including gross profit margin, twelve-
month earnings and dividend growth, market-to-book value, dividend yield, and return on equity as optimal for 
factors lagged by one month and the same factors were found to yield the optimal multivariate model for factors 
lagged by six months except that return on assets was found to replace return on equity. While these factors 
demonstrated ability to explain variation, the trend in residuals that remains leaves room for the addition of further 
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